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Abstract 
Private  governance  is  currently  being  evoked  as  a  viable  solution  to  many  public  policy 
goals. However, in some circumstances it has shown to produce more harm than good, and 
even  disastrous  consequences  as  in the  case  of the  financial  crisis  that  is  raging  in  most 
advanced  economies.  Although  the  current  track  record  of private  regulatory schemes  is 
mixed, policy guidance documents around the world still require that policy-makers give 
priority to self- and co-regulation, with little or no additional guidance being given to policy-
makers  to  devise  when,  and  under  what  circumstances,  these  solutions  can prove  viable 
from a public policy perspective. With an array of examples from several policy fields, this 
paper approaches regulation as a public-private collaborative form and attempts to identify 
possible  policy  tools  to  be  applied  by  public  policy-makers  to  efficiently  and  effectively 
approach private governance as a solution, rather than a problem. We propose a six-step 
theoretical  framework  and  argue  that  IA  techniques  should:  i)  define  an  integrated 
framework  including  both  the  possibility  that  private  regulation  can  be  used  as  an 
alternative or as a complement to public legislation; ii) involve private parties in public IAs 
in  order  to  define  the  best  strategy  or  strategies  that  would  ensure  achievement  of  the 
regulatory  objectives;  and  iii)  contemplate  the  deployment  of  indicators  related  to 
governance and activities of the regulators and their ability to coordinate and solve disputes 
with other regulators.  
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CEPS Working Document No. 370/September 2012 
Fabrizio Cafaggi and Andrea Renda 
ver  the  past  three  decades,  a  growing  number  of  national  governments  and 
international  organizations  have  taken  action  to  promote  greater  awareness  in 
governments’  approach  to  the  formulation,  implementation  and  revision  of  legal 
rules.  Smart  regulation  tools  such  as  ex  ante  regulatory  impact  analysis  (RIA)  are  being 
heavily  sponsored  internationally,  and  coupled  with  the  promotion  of  stakeholder 
consultation  and  participatory  decision-making,  monitoring  of  the  implementation  of 
legislation, and ex post evaluation.1 Guidance documents and overarching principles on ‘how 
to  regulate’  have  proliferated  thanks  to  the  work  of  OECD,  the  World  Bank  and  other 
international  organizations,  including  the  United  States  Office  of  Information  and 
Regulatory Affairs and the European Commission, whose Impact Assessment Guidelines are 
being adopted as reference by many EU and non-EU countries.2 Moreover, the need for a 
risk-based approach to regulation and inspections, as well as enhanced attention for ‘cutting 
red  tape’  –  i.e.  reducing  administrative  burdens  generated  by  public  legislation  –  are 
becoming firmly embedded patterns in many countries’ smart regulation agenda.3  
At  the  same  time,  in  particular  with  the  financial  and  economic  crisis  that  disrupted  the 
global economy since 2007, the idea of ‘how to regulate’ is undergoing thorough revisiting. 
Undoubtedly,  besides  an  array  of  disastrous  consequences,  the  crisis  has  also  created 
opportunities  for  a  better  understanding  of  how  markets  (do  not)  work,  and  how 
governments  can  interact  with  private  players  to  achieve  public  policy  goals  more 
effectively. One of the consequences of this trend is that the ‘less is more’ philosophy that 
dominated the 1980s and 1990s, mostly aimed at minimizing public interference with market 
forces, is no longer a dominant paradigm.4 The need to ensure at least regular monitoring of 
market outcomes by public policymakers is considered as a basic safeguard of social welfare: 
at the same time, even the basic paradigms of competition-oriented legislation, such as the 
liberalization of network industries, are being challenged as potentially sub-optimal, leaving 
room  for  intermediate  solutions  between  the  laissez  faire  and  ‘command  and  control’ 
legislation.  
Meanwhile, confidence in the virtues of market-generated outcomes, as well as distrust for 
government’s  ability  to  regulate,  has  led  to  widespread  advocacy  for  forms  of  private 
regulation in lieu of public regulation. As a legacy of this belief, most guidance documents on 
ex ante  policy  appraisal  specify  that  governments  should  award  priority  to  self-  and  co-
                                                   
1 See Renda (2011) for an overview.  
2 See European Commission (2010); and OECD (2009). 
3 See OECD (2010). 
4 We  refer  to  the  idea that  dominated  economic  theory  and  international  regulatory reform  in the 
1980s and 1990s, namely the belief that reducing the amount of regulation would trigger increases in 
competitiveness. A good example is the publication by the UK Better Regulation Task Force, entitled 
“Regulation - Less is more. Reducing burdens, improving outcomes”, dated March 2005.  
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regulatory  solutions  before  starting  to  consider  more  intrusive  policy  approaches.5 As  a 
result, key policy domains have increasingly been left in the remit of private players, with 
limited or no interference by public policymakers. The trend towards increasing reliance on 
private governance and regulation by public policymakers is visible also in the field that 
generated the current crisis, i.e. financial markets. Consider the unfortunate decision, in the 
United  States,  to  delegate  to  private  regulation  a  key  area  for  public  policy  such  as  the 
supervision of banks’ risk exposure:6 the disastrous consequences of the decision to delegate 
risk  monitoring  to  the  private-led  Consolidated  Supervised  Entities  program  in  the  US 
ultimately  led  Nobel Prize  Joseph  Stiglitz  to  argue that  “self-regulation  is preposterous”. 
And even Nicolas Sarkozy commented that self-regulation was finished, and that principles-
based regulation lost all its credibility in the financial services sector.  
The problem of risk supervision in financial markets is perhaps the single most astounding 
black hole of public policy in the past century.7 But how could such a huge regulatory gap 
emerge? Some commentators have pointed the finger at the lack of real policy appraisal in 
the US financial regulation: as a matter of fact, tools such as RIA are not compulsory in the 
United States beyond secondary legislation passed by government agencies (Renda, 2006); 
since the SEC is an independent agency, its decisions were not subject to a publicly available, 
motivated economic analysis, which would have included risk assessment. However, this 
amounts only to a fairly incomplete explanation: suffice it to recall that in the EU, a long, 
detailed and costly Impact Assessment produced in 2004 by the European Commission on 
the capital adequacy directive that would form integral part of the Basel II package, after 
considering the results of four external studies, reported that “even if no regulatory regime is 
able to completely eliminate the possibility for banking crisis, the new framework should 
nevertheless help reduce the frequency of such incidents”.8 As one of us reported in a recent 
book, the fact that the subprime mortgage crisis led also to a credit crunch and an economic 
crisis in the EU also depends on the very bad functioning of the large exposure reporting 
system foreseen by the Basel II package: in a nutshell, banks that had limited information 
about their risk exposure enjoyed relative discretion in selecting information to be sent to 
supervisory authorities: this ultimately led the system to walk on thin ice, until the system 
broke down (Renda, 2011; FSB, de la Larosière report, Turner report). 
                                                   
5 See inter alia Senden (2005) and Saurwein (2011). Co-regulation was described by van Schooten & 
Verschuuren (2008) as an element of “non-state law” backed by “some government involvement”. 
6  In  2004,  after  the  highly  contested  1999  Gramm-Leach-Bliley  Act  passed  by  the  Clinton 
Administration – and also due to the lack of explicit statutory authority to require investment bank 
holding companies to report their capital, maintain liquidity, or submit to leverage requirements – the 
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  (SEC)  created  the  Consolidated  Supervised  Entities  (CSE) 
Program as a way for global investment bank conglomerates that lacked a supervisor under law to 
voluntarily submit to regulation. This gradually led to delegating to private banks the supervision of 
risk  and  the  preservation  of  sustainable  banks’  debt-equity  ratios,  beyond  the  reach  of  public 
policymakers.  In  2008,  the  Chairman  of  the  SEC  Christopher  Cox  declared  that  “when  Congress 
passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, it created a significant regulatory gap by failing to give to the 
SEC or any agency the authority to regulate large investment bank holding companies, like Goldman 
Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns”. He added very simply 
that “the last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work”, and 
put the CSE Program to an end.  
7 SEC Chairman Cox reflected on the fact that today “a massive hole remains: the approximately $60 
trillion credit default swap (CDS) market, which is regulated by no agency of government. Neither the 
SEC nor any regulator has authority even to require minimum disclosure.” 
8 SEC (2004)921, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council relating to the 
taking  up  and  pursuit  of  the  business  of  credit  institutions  (recast),  14  July  2007 
(http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/ia_carried_out/docs/ia_2004/sec_2004_0921_en.pdf). PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REGULATION: MAPPING THE LABYRINTH | 3 
 
Against this background, the financial crisis can teach us two separate lessons from the two 
sides  of  the  Atlantic.  In  the  US,  reliance  on  the  private  sector  was  simply  ill-conceived, 
especially since private players have been invited to coordinate to solve a market failure, 
with  no  control  whatsoever  on  the  side  of  government.  To  the  contrary,  in  the  EU  the 
supervision of risk exposure was not fully delegated to the banking sector: however, public 
policy was based on a badly designed reporting system, which – although compulsory – led 
to  an  exacerbation  of  information  distortion  in  the  system.  With  a  degree  of  over-
simplification, one could say there was a failure of private regulation in the US, and a failure 
of public regulation and oversight in the EU.  
The recent history of financial markets, although certainly being the ‘poster child’ of this 
uncertain  generation  of  public  policy,  is  however  only  the  tip  of  a  much  larger  iceberg. 
Although private governance is often aimed at ensuring the (private) production of public 
goods, commentators have started to spot cases in which reliance on private regulation is 
either excessive or misplaced. Examples are numerous, and relate to a wide spectrum of 
policy domains: from the ‘Action Plan’ implemented in the US by the Utilities Solid Wastes 
Activity Group (USWAG) to foster the adoption of strict standards for groundwater safety9; 
to the obscure effects of widespread public-private interaction in crucial initiatives such as 
the Africa Stockpiles Programme (Falkner, 2003); to the failure of private regulation to keep 
down  international  roaming  tariffs  in  the  EU  (which  led  to  action  being  taken  by  the 
Commission in 2007); and to many examples of self-regulation, e.g. in legal professions and 
pension schemes.  
So,  should  we  just  get  rid  of  the  idea  that  private  players  can  be  good  regulators?  The 
answer, of course, is no. As a matter of fact, there is widespread agreement on the fact that 
many  forms  of  private  governance  pursue  highly  desirable  goals  from  a  societal 
perspective.10 For example, voluntary certification and standardization bodies often aim at 
re-allocating entitlements, solving collective action problems and raising the awareness of 
end consumers on the respect of minimum health- or environment- related standards. In 
some  cases,  private  players  decide  to  coordinate  in  order  to  solve  market  failures  that 
governments  are  unable  to  tackle;  in  other  cases,  private  regulation  aims  at  fixing 
government failures, especially when international supply chains penetrate territories with 
very weak rule of law enforcements; in other cases, private players organize to avoid that 
public regulators step into a specific policy area to regulate directly; and in yet another range 
of cases, private players coordinate to achieve socially undesirable goals, such as collective 
boycotts,  cartels,  exchange  of  information  among  competitors  and  other  anticompetitive 
behaviour (Cafaggi, 2010).  
Against this background, what creates concern is that public bodies seem to have developed 
no  means  to  design  collaborative  forms  of  control  the  evolution  of  public/private 
governance.  This  paper  thus  seeks  to  lay  the  foundations  for  a  better  understanding  of 
private governance for public policy purposes. Section 1 below briefly summarizes the main 
reasons  for  the  emergence  of  private  governance  and  its  justification  from  a  theoretical 
perspective. Section 2 provides a taxonomy of existing forms of private governance. Section 3 
describes  current  trends,  including  the  emergence  of  meta-private  regulators  that  aim  at 
bridging  the  gap  between  public  policy  and  private  governance.  Section  4  concludes  by 
                                                   
9 In  2008,  a chain  of  events  led  to  the collapse  of  an earthen dam  in  Tennessee,  and  a  toxic  stew 
containing 5.4 million cubic yards of coal ash inundated a portion of Roane County and contaminated 
a river coursing through a far larger region of Appalachia (quote). 
10 More  generally,  an  important  difference  can  be  established  between  industry-led  and  NGO-led 
private regulatory schemes. 4 | CAFAGGI & RENDA 
 
proposing  a  theoretical  framework  for  the  assessment  of  private  governance  by  public 
policymakers.  
1.  Private governance: a theoretical framework 
The variety of private regulatory schemes in place is remarkable, encompassing inter alia 
common rules, memoranda of understanding, regulatory contracts, codes of conduct and 
voluntary  agreements  by  which  economic  actors,  social  players,  NGOs  and  organized 
groups establish themselves voluntarily to regulate and organize their activities.11 In some 
cases, private regulation emerges spontaneously, independently of any legislative or policy 
initiative (e.g. in the case of forestry where was the failure of reaching consensus at the Rio 
conference in 1992, or advertising codes of conduct). In other cases, it blossoms as a response 
to the threat of command and control regulation (e.g. industry agreements on passive safety 
measures for cars; Responsible Care; the ICC Business Charter for Sustainable Development; 
the global confectionary industry’s code of conduct banning forced child labour; or even the 
failed attempt to strike a co-regulatory deal to set pan-European, affordable roaming tariffs 
for  the  use  of  the  mobile  phone  across  EU  member  states).12 In  yet  another  set  of  cases, 
private regulation takes the form of an industry association with a specific mission and a 
management board that even represents external interests, in order to ensure alignment with 
the public interest, often as a result from public opinion campaigns (so-called ‘naming and 
shaming’,  sometimes  also  aimed  at  individual  companies,  such  as  Starbucks  or  Nestlé). 
Finally, in some cases private regulation simply hides a cartel (e.g. in antitrust cases such as 
i.a. Allied tube and cases of collective boycott involving industry associations) (Maher, 2011). 
Against this background, academics have traditionally shown very little faith in the virtues 
of  private  regulation: as  observed  by  Anthony Ogus  (1999)),  “self-regulation,  understood 
narrowly as law formulated by private agencies to govern professional and trading activities, 
has been rigorously criticized by lawyers and economists alike”. Some lawyers tend to see it 
as an example of modern corporatism, whereas economists tend to spot traces of collusion in 
most private regulatory schemes; political science frames private regulation either from the 
perspective  of  transaction  cost  politics,  in  which  public  policymakers  delegate  certain 
functions to private regulators (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999; Tuohy & Wolfson, 1978); or as 
the result of rent-seeking behaviour (Tullock, 1967). Overall, the potential for abuse has been 
                                                   
11 As reported by Vogel (2010), there are now more than 300 industry or product codes, nearly all of 
which  address  labour  or  environmental  practices;  many  sectors  and  products  are  governed  by 
multiple  codes.  More  than  3,000  global  firms  now  regularly  issue  reports  on  the  social  and 
environmental practices and many of these firms have developed their own codes and/or subscribe to 
one  or  more  industry  or  cross-industry  codes.  The  largest  private  business  code,  the  UN  Global 
Compact, has more than 3,500 corporate signatories. More than 2,300 global firms have endorsed the 
Business Charter for Sustainable Development developed by the International Chamber of Commerce 
and  more  than  46,000  firms  have  been  certified  as  complaint  with  ISO  14001,  an  environmental 
process  standard. More  than 70 major  global  financial  institutions  from 16 countries, representing 
assets of $4.5 trillion, have signed the United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment. 
12 Responsible Care was adopted by several national chemical industry associations in part to forestall 
national  laws  establishing  more  stringent  plant  safety  standards  following  the  Union  Carbide 
chemical  plant  explosion  at  Bhopal,  India,  in  1984.  The  International  Chamber  of  Commerce’s 
Business Charter for Sustainable Development was initiated by global firms who feared that the 1992 
Rio  “Earth  Summit”  would  lead  to  an  expansion  of  global  environmental  regulations.  The  global 
confectionary industry adopted a code of conduct banning forced child labour in part as a response to 
the threat of American trade sanctions on imports of cocoa from West Africa. During the 1990s, many 
apparel  producers  and  retailers  endorsed  voluntary  international  labour  standards  to  secure 
Congressional support for the renewal of China’s most favoured nation status as a trading partner. 
See Vogel (2010). PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REGULATION: MAPPING THE LABYRINTH | 5 
 
highlighted by scholars from all social sciences (Page, 1986; Cane, 1987; Harden & Lewis, 
1986;  Ogus,  1995;  Shaked  &  Sutton,  1981).  At  the same  time,  this  traditional  approach  is 
believed  to  have  been  excessively  partisan  vis-à-vis  private  regulation:  recent  efforts  to 
analyze  the  emergence  of  private  regulatory  schemes  has  led  to  a  more  nuanced  and 
balanced  approach  to  this  form  of  governance,  especially  with  respect  to  NGOs-driven 
private  regulatory  schemes  and  the  growing  number  of  multi-stakeholder  initiatives  at 
transnational  level  (Dixit,  2004;  Cafaggi,  2005,  2006,  2010;  Senden,  2005; Abbot  &  Snidal, 
2009s; Buthe, 2010; Büthe & Mattli, 2011). 
Today, the role of private governance schemes is again under the spotlight, mostly since 
traditional forms of public intervention are facing enormous, and probably insurmountable 
difficulties  in  coping  with  certain  policy  problems.  The  weaknesses  of  public  regulation 
emerge  more  specifically  at  the  transnational  level  where  difficulties  to  coordinate, 
inconsistency  between  standard  setting  and  enforcement,  divergences  between 
administrative and judicial enforcement and within the latter among domestic courts make 
transnational  public  regulation  an  insufficient  response.  We  refer  in  particular  to  three 
outstanding policy domains.  
Firstly, there are goods and services that transcend national boundaries and as such do not 
lend themselves easily to direct regulation by national policy-makers. This is mostly the case 
of international public goods, (e.g. deforestation, emission reduction), for which international 
regulatory cooperation is heavily needed, in particular since absent coordination a ‘race to 
the  bottom’  occurs,  which  can  lead  to  disastrous  outcomes  such  as  a  ‘tragedy  of  the 
commons’ (Hardin, 1968). Early experiences such as the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC) 
and the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) have filled an enormous policy gap created by 
the lack of international cooperation. Only recently, as testified by forthcoming work at the 
OECD, the need to strengthen international regulatory cooperation has been placed under 
the spotlight in the global policy community.  
Secondly, there are markets that exhibit very fast-changing dynamics – so fast-changing that 
public  policymakers  become  awkward  when  trying to  regulate  them.  This  is  the  case,  in 
particular, of high-tech and knowledge-intensive markets, in which the fast pace of change 
and  the  highly  technical  nature  of  the  information  needed  to  regulate  effectively  leads 
policymakers  with  the  need  to  rely  on  private  parties,  at  least  for  the  definition  of 
implementing measures and technical specifications. Examples include, but are not limited 
to, standardization policy, international roaming, net neutrality regulation, cloud computing, 
privacy on the Internet, and Internet governance. 
Thirdly,  as  a  residual  category,  there  are  policy  problems  that  inevitably  require  heavy 
reliance on the expertise of private actors, since the latter are the most informed parties, or 
the best positioned players to fix a given failure, or simply the only parties holding control 
over given, essential resources. These fields include widely diverse policy domains, such as 
(again) financial risk regulation, but also sustainability reporting and critical infrastructure 
protection, in which an estimated 85% of critical infrastructure is in private hands (Renda, 
2010).  
Against this background, the origins of private governance schemes can be related to various 
causes and motivations, which can be broadly classified as follows.  
-  Signalling  and  enhancing  legitimacy.  Some  private  governance  schemes  respond  to 
signals sent by the market or by civil society (e.g. sustainability reporting, ethical trading, 
environmental protection  and  business  ‘greenwashing’,  respect  of  labour  rights,  child 6 | CAFAGGI & RENDA 
 
labour etc.).13 These include schemes that emerge due to the need to sustainably govern 
common  resources  (e.g.  in  the  case  of  the  FSC  and  the  MSC).14 A  specific  type  of 
signalling occurs when private actors seek to increase the legitimacy of their activities: for 
instance,  the  International  Organization  for  Standardization  (ISO),  when  deciding  to 
expand its scope into the area of social responsibility faced a number of obstacles, in 
particular concerning question of representation: given its traditional tendency towards 
involving mostly industrialized countries and businesses, ISO sought to involve other 
stakeholders  by  creating  a  system  including  six  groups:  Consumer,  government, 
industry,  labour,  NGO,  and  others.15 Part  of  this more  inclusive process  was  also  the 
conclusion  of  Memoranda  of  Understanding  (MoUs)  with  the  relevant  International 
Organizations  in  the  area  of  social  standard  setting.16 Here,  the  need  to  ensure  the 
legitimacy of the process and of the final outcome can be seen as one reason to engage 
into cooperation. 
-  Controlling the value chain. Other schemes were created due to the need to control the 
supply  chain,  especially  in  the  case  of  large  retailers  relying  on  local  suppliers  in 
countries  with  very  weak  rule  of  law  (e.g.  the  GlobalGAP  scheme,  corporate  social 
responsibility, food safety). In the area of food safety the adoption of the supply chain 
approach by public regulation earlier in Europe and later in the US has delegated and 
empowered large MNC with the regulatory power and responsibility to control safety 
along the chain (Gereffi et al., 2005; Cafaggi, 2012a). In the area of CSR codes are often 
implemented  via  contracting  as  illustrated  by  the  case  of  private  service  military 
company and by private security services (Francioni & Ronzitti, 2011; Dickinson, 2011). 
-  Efficiency, inter-firm coordination and co-opetition. Some forms of private governance 
are dictated by the need to enhance inter-firm coordination for pro-competitive purposes. 
This is typically the example of patent pools (Lerner & Tirole, 2004; Merges, 1996; Gallini, 
2011).  
-  Reducing  transaction  costs  through  standardization.  As  an  example,  ISO  and  other 
technical  standard  setters  engage  into  cooperation  with  more  specialized  technical 
regulators when necessary.17 In the area of social responsibility, interoperability seems to 
be  of  importance  as  well.  As  already  outlined  above,  in  the  creation  of  ISO  26000 
                                                   
13 The term ‘greenwashing’ is used to refer to cases in which which green marketing is deceptively 
used to promote the perception that an organization's aims and policies are environmentally friendly. 
American environmentalist Jay Westerveld coined the term in 1986 in response to a hotel’s efforts to 
encourage guests to help the environment by reusing towels. See, for an application to the oil market, 
M.A.  Cherry  and  J.F.  Sneirson  (2012),  “Chevron,  Greenwashing,  and  the  Myth  of  ‘Green  Oil 
Companies’”, Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment, Vol. 3.  
14 See,  for  an  introduction  to  the  governance of  common  resources, van  Waarden  (2010). And  for 
applications to the MSC and FSC, see Gale & Haward (2004) and Curtin & Senden (2011). 
15 See J. Diller, “Private Standardization in Public International Lawmaking”, Pending Publication 33 
Michigan Journal of International Law (2011) at 11. 
16 Ibid., p. 16. 
17 See, e.g. the MoU between the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the International 
Organization  of  Standardization  (ISO),  the  International  Telecommunication  Union  (ITU)  and  the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN-ECE) Concerning Standardization in the Field 
of  Electronic  Business  (http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/e-business/files/mou.pdf);  MoU  between  the 
International  Union  of  Leather  Technologists  and  Chemists  and  ISO  on  Cooperation  in  the 
Development of Standards Associated with the Testing of Tanned Leather and Tanning Products. See 
regarding  cooperation  agreements  of  CEN: 
(http://www.cen.eu/cen/AboutUs/CENnetwork/Relations/MoUs/Pages/default.aspx/). PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REGULATION: MAPPING THE LABYRINTH | 7 
 
considerable emphasis was put on ensuring the inter-operability of its own standards 
with  already  existing  regulation  in  the  area.  Apart  from  the  participation  of  a  great 
number  of  organizations  in  the  standard-setting  process,  ISO  engaged  in  further 
cooperation regarding implementation. It signed, for instance, a MoU with the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI), in order to ensure that businesses can better implement ISO 
26000  into  their  sustainability  reporting  within the  GRI  framework.18 Another  way  to 
reduce transaction costs is the avoidance or resolution of conflicts. Generally speaking, 
most cooperative forms include some conflict preventing elements, since they usually at 
least slightly curb the risk of conflict: entities create an environment where they have the 
opportunity to exchange information and to collaborate and thereby address emerging 
conflicts at a very early stage.19 They furthermore often provide for a harmonization of 
their  regulatory  approaches  which  also  helps  to  avoid  conflicts  at  an  ex  ante stage.20 
Finally, even though a private regulator might have the ability, as well as the competence 
to conduct a particular regulatory activity, it might be more efficient to engage into co-
operation with one of several other regulators. For example, if standards already exist, 
the costly process of drafting a new one could be saved. Moreover, regulatees would not 
have to adapt their activities (e.g. reporting) to yet another regulatory regime but could 
comply with the different standards emerging from different regimes without additional 
burden. Hence, from efficiency perspective there could be two incentives for regulators 
to cooperate with each other: First, to streamline and decrease the efforts and costs of the 
organization  itself  by  merging  capacities  in  the  regulatory  process,  and  secondly,  to 
decrease effort and costs of the regulatees. 
-  Complementing or pre-empting public  regulation.  Some  private governance  initiatives 
emerge  as  a  complement  to  existing  public  policy,  to  facilitate  implementation  and 
compliance  with  existing  public  regulation.  Institutional  complementarity  between 
private  and  public  emerge  at  standard  setting  level,  monitoring  and  enforcement 
(Cafaggi, 2006, 2010). This is the case, i.a. of the ‘new approach’ to standardization in 
force  in  the  EU since Directive  98/34  of  22  June  1998)  (Schepel,  2005). Also,  to some 
extent  GlobalGAP  can  be  seen  as  complementing  existing  public  regulation.21 To  the 
contrary, some private governance schemes were created with a clear objective to pre-
empt and avoid public regulation. This approach is often labelled private regulation in 
the  shadow  of  legislation  (Héritier,  2002),  and  can  be  observed,  inter  alia,  in  several 
environmental regimes.  
-  Quality  and  Effectiveness.  Quality  and  Effectiveness  can  be  important  incentives  for 
private  regulatory  cooperation  on  different  stages  of  the  regulatory  process.  At  the 
standard setting stage cooperative agreements, in particular those dealing with technical 
                                                   
18 “The MoU is intended to leverage the activities of the two organizations related to reporting and 
benchmarking by business and on sustainable development by sharing information on ISO standards 
and GRI programmes, teaming up with other partners, participating in the development of new or 
revised  documents,  joint  promotion  and  communication.”  Information  available  at: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/pressrelease.htm?refid=Ref1460. 
19 See e.g. Articles 3 & 4 MoU between ILO/ISO and the MoU between Internet Platforms and Rights 
Owners. 
20 See e.g. the MoU between FELABAN/UNEP or the MoU between FAO/ILO. 
21 See i.a. Sorsa (2011), stating that “without GlobalGAP, farmers and exporters in DCs would have to 
come to grips themselves with complicated EU regulations on food safety and those of the member 
states as well”, and that in this sense, “private food schemes help to reduce the transaction costs by 
making  information  about  European  regulations  on  food  safety  systematically  available  and 
practically achievable”(http://regulation.upf.edu/dublin-10-papers/1H4.pdf).  8 | CAFAGGI & RENDA 
 
standard setting put significant emphasis on the desire to increase effectiveness through 
the  common  approach. 22  Cooperation  allows  these  organizations  to  distribute  the 
different tasks necessary in technical standardization processes and to avoid duplication 
of efforts. Moreover, a high number of cooperative projects, pursue the goal to streamline 
or harmonize existing standards in order to avoid duplication effects on their addresses.23 
Finally, it is also important to mention that cooperative approaches do not automatically 
increase  effectiveness.  The  inclusion  of  a  high  number  of  stakeholders,  the  need  to 
provide  assistance,  such  as  translations  and  other  measures  which  might  become 
necessary  in  a  cooperative  approach,  can  decelerate  a  standard  setting  process 
significantly  and  thus  impact  its  effectiveness. 24  Cooperative  approaches  can  also 
improve effectiveness of compliance mechanisms. Private regulation is often (not always) 
based on soft law mechanisms and voluntariness. Compliance is based on considerations 
such  as  cost-efficiency,  self-interest,  and  reputational  aspects.  The  later  concerns,  in 
particular, firms acting in markets with direct consumer contact. Necessary pressure may 
also originate from other private actors, such as investors or insures, or from the public 
side,  such  as  national  regulatory  agencies.  Under  these  conditions  organizations  and 
members to private organizations want create an environment where it is difficult for a 
single actor to not comply with a particular set of standards as this would close many 
economic possibilities. Against this background the question to be answered is in how far 
cooperation can positively impact compliance with the respective standards. To begin 
with, it has to be clarified that agreements very often only contain provisions that deal 
with  the  implementation  of  regulatory  standards.25 Less  common  are  provisions  that 
explicitly stipulate cooperation regarding compliance mechanism or even enforcement.26 
An interesting exception is ISO26000, which had the incentive to provide a harmonized 
standard on social responsibility that would help organizations (in particular businesses) 
to comply with these obligations.27 Notable in this context is a provision from the MoU 
between ILO/ISO, which stipulates that ISO’s “activities … [will] [c]omplement the role 
of  governments  in  ensuring  compliance  with  international  labour  standards”.28 Hence 
through the cooperation with the industry-driven ISO, ILO is expecting also support the 
efforts to ensure compliance with its standards. Apart from this example a number of 
regulatory  agreements  are  based  on  the  intention  to  increase  compliance  with  the 
involved  regulatory  regimes.  Usually,  however,  this  rationale  is  located  more  in  the 
background and is only rarely mentioned explicitly in the MoUs themselves. 
-  Collusion/mutual benefit. Some private governance arrangements can also hide strategic 
anti-competitive purposes, as is the case for collective boycott schemes and cartels. Also, 
existing (and often concealed) private agreements between content providers and ISPs 
                                                   
22 See MoU between IEC/ISO/ITU/UN-ECE; MoU between Internet Platforms and Rights Owners. 
23 See, e.g. the MoU between GRI/GC; see furthermore the MoU between LEI/FSC. 
24 An  example  for  a  very  inclusive  process  is  the  creation  of  ISO  26000.  See  Diller,  J.  M.,  (2012), 
“Private Standardization in Public International Lawmaking”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 33, No. 3, Spring 2012, pp. 481-536. 
25 MoU  between  LEI/FSC;  Articles  3.1  and  3.5  of  the  MoU  between  IPL/UNEP,  but  see  also  the 
Alliance between GRI/GC, where it is stressed that the “GRI Sustainability Reporting Framework is a 
voluntary ESG reporting and stakeholder engagement and management tool and should not be viewed as a 
compliance framework”, available at: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/news/50-06-24-2010. 
26 See para. 18 MoU between Internet Platforms and Rights Owners.  
27  See  http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/management_and_leadership_standards/social_ 
responsibility/sr_iso26000_overview.htm 
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for the purpose of enabling copyright infringement in cyberspace often go beyond what 
public regulation would entail, especially in terms of copyright scope and respect for 
user privacy and network neutrality.  
-  Other Incentives. These include at least two additional reasons:  
o  Broadening the scope of regulatory activities, e.g. as in the case of ISO, which expanded 
from  pure  technical  standard  setting  into  social  responsibility.  As  this  field  was 
already  occupied  by  a  number  of  IOs,  such  as  the  UN,  the  OECD  and  the  ILO, 
cooperation became a way to foster activities into the new area and to ensure that 
they fit within the already existing framework.  
Achieving  Competitive  Advantage.  In  case  there  are  several  regulators  but  not  all  of  them 
engage into regulatory cooperation this could provide the ones participating with strategic 
advantages.  They  could  have  available  more  capacities, more  members,  regulatees,  more 
beneficiaries, and potentially higher legitimacy and greater effectiveness. The new situation 
could trigger additional growth and could again be used for more and better regulation. On 
the  downside,  the  additional  power  could  also  be  exploited  and  the  positive  effects  of 
competition could again be decelerated. Finally, standards could become diluted if too many 
interests have to be considered in the cooperative project. Empirical examples include the 
cooperation between FSC and LEI, which was reportedly triggered by the need to challenge 
competing  organizations  such  as  the  Programme  for  Endorsement  of  Forest  Certification 
(PEFC).29 The  most  appropriate  public  policy  approach  towards  these  various  forms  of 
private governance is of course different, depending on the motivation for its creation. This 
is why, in order to develop a theoretical framework for the assessment of private regulatory 
schemes,  it  is  essential  to  develop  a  taxonomy  of  such  schemes,  so  that  tailored  policy 
appraisal tools can be designed.  
1.1  Building a taxonomy of private governance  
As already recalled above, any attempt to reach a complete taxonomy of existing forms of 
private  governance  is  inevitably  doomed  to  remain  incomplete.  So  far,  authors  such  as 
Abbott  &  Snidal  (2009b)  have  tried  to  reach  an  operational  taxonomy  by  distinguishing 
existing  schemes  based  on  the  nature  of  their  participants.  Figure  1  below  shows  their 
‘governance  triangle’,  in  which  a  large  number  of  governance  organizations  are  located 
along a triangular space based on the relative prevalence of State actors, NGOs or private 
firms.  In  addition,  we  have  highlighted  a  number  of  areas,  namely  the  area  of  business 
associations,  such  as  the  International  Chamber  of  Commerce,  which  produce  relevant 
private  regulation  i.a. in  the  form  of  codes  of  conducts;  and  the  top  area  of  the  triangle, 
which  hosts  forms  of International  Regulatory Cooperation  such  as  the  OECD  and  other 
forms, which the OECD itself is currently studying. Most of the private governance schemes 
we  have  been  discussing  and  defining  in  the  previous  pages  are  anyway  located  in  the 
middle-lower area of the triangle: in the figure, we have highlighted the Forest Stewardship 
Council, the Marine Stewardship Council, and the Global Reporting Initiative.  
                                                   
29  See  Frequently  Asked  Questions  Memorandum  of  Understanding  between  FSC  and  LEI 
(http://www.fsc.org/fileadmin/web-data/public/document_center/News/Press_releases/FSC-SS-
2010-07-14-LEI_FSC_MoU_FAQ-EN.pdf). 10 | CAFAGGI & RENDA 
 
Figure 1. The governance triangle in Abbot and Snidal (2009b) 
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Source: Own elaboration based on Abbott & Snidal (2009b). 
However,  the  taxonomy  developed  by  Abbott  &  Snidal  (2009b)  based  on  the  nature  of 
participants provides  an  insufficient  basis  for  the  evaluation  of  the  effectiveness and  the 
welfare-enhancing nature of private governance schemes. More recent attempts by the same 
authors have led to the definition of a different framework, which refers to the phases of the 
policy cycle carried out by the scheme under scrutiny. Figure 2 below shows an elaboration 
on  the  so-called  ANIME  framework,  which  distinguishes  between  forms  of  private 
governance and the phases of the policy cycle in which these forms become active. Under 
this theoretical framework, some private governance schemes focus on specific steps of the 
policy process, such as enforcement and compliance. One typical example is conservation 
and land trusts, or forms of regulation by contract that aim mostly at fostering compliance 
where  litigation  would  prove  costly,  unpredictable  or  simply  impossible.  Other  forms  of 
private regulation mostly focus on the setting of technical standards, as is the case of CSR 
schemes  incorporating  ISO  standards.  Other  organizations  focus  either  on  the 
implementation  of  existing  public  regulation,  or  on  monitoring  and  compliances.  To  the 
contrary, there are some types of organizations that replace public policy in all its aspects, 
including the setting of the over-arching agenda in a given policy field.  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REGULATION: MAPPING THE LABYRINTH | 11 
 
Figure 2. Functional typologies: the ANIME framework 
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Source: Own elaboration based on Abbott & Snidal (2009b) and Roberts (2011). 
1.2  Regulation as a form of public-private cooperation: a transaction cost 
politics approach 
From  a  theoretical  perspective,  the  emergence  of  private  schemes  that  govern  private 
behaviour beyond, and often independently of, public legislation can be approached from a 
variety of perspectives – although in reality, almost none of them has been fully applied to 
this issue. First, an important precondition for delegating the achievement of public policy 
goals to private governance is a vision of the ‘art of the state’ that is focused on facilitating 
the interaction of private parties, rather than on command and control regulation. This is 
typically  a  legacy  of  the  work  of  Ronald  Coase  (1960)  and,  even  more  importantly,  the 
subsequent elaboration by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed (1972), which led to the 
identification of certain private institutions – so-called ‘rule 4’ organizations – that emerge 
with  the  specific  purpose  to  reallocate  entitlements  and  thus  save  on  transaction  costs 
(Ayres, 2005; Roberts, 2011). In addition, the literature on the optimal governance of common 
resources suggests that private parties can interact to efficiently correct market failures and 
optimize governance of common resources, avoiding risk of depletion (Hardin, 1968; Heller, 
2008; Ostrom, 1990 and 2005). 
But even more notably, a very useful way of looking at the potential for private regulation to 
achieve public policy goals is an adaptation of the ‘Williamsonian’, ‘make or buy’ approach, 
which sees private governance as the result of an implicit decision to externalize a given 
phase of the policy process. Just like private businesses decide whether to insource or out-
source a give part of the production process based on a comparison between administrative 
costs  and  transaction  costs,  the  choice  of  private  regulation  would  emerge  in  a  policy 
decision only where evidence suggests that this is the most cost-effective way of achieving a 
given policy outcome; or whenever this option maximizes net benefits. In choosing private 
regulation, then governments should take into account the public interest – something for 
which it was democratically appointed. 
From a more theoretical standpoint, private regulation can thus emerge in two main forms: i) 
when  civil  society  directly  empowers  private  regulators  for  the  achievement  of  socially 12 | CAFAGGI & RENDA 
 
desirable  results  (see  e.g.  Ostrom  1999);  and  ii)  when  civil  society  ‘delegates’  regulatory 
powers  to  government,  and  the  latter  decides  to  delegate  regulatory  activities  to  private 
players  through  self-  or  co-  regulation.  In  this  latter  case  a  ‘double  delegation’  scenario 
occurs, where delegation by government is based on different rationales compared to the 
initial delegation made by civil society. When this happens, government must also guarantee 
the  achievement  of  public  policy  goals  by  creating  and  implementing  monitoring 
mechanisms and procedures, which become a safeguard for civil society as a whole.  
This view is consistent with the view adopted by the ‘transaction cost politics’ approach, in 
which  the  regulatory  activity  is  seen  as  a  principal-agent  problem,  where  the  principal 
(government or Parliament) delegates regulatory power to an agent (public or private); and 
the latter regulates under the supervision of the former (Epstein & O’Halloran, 1999). In our 
case, the ultimate principal is always civil society: governments are agents with respect to 
citizens, and become principals when delegating powers to public agencies, ministers, or 
private  regulators.  At  the  same  time,  this  approach  is  consistent  with  the  so-called 
‘institutional  complementarity’  concept  developed  in  comparative  law  and  institutional 
analysis (Aoki, 2001; Cafaggi, 2006 and 2010). This implies that public and private regulation 
emerge through co-evolution patterns, which ultimately select ‘who does what’ to address 
societal problems (Lipschutz & Fogel, 2002). In our case, most co-evolution mechanisms do 
not select either public or private regulation: rather, in most cases the two interact and merge 
into hybrid forms, where some of the phases of the policy cycle are performed by delegated 
political agents; and other by private parties.  
Against this background, private regulation can prove more effective than public regulation 
for a number of reasons: for example, according to Coglianese et al. (2004), self-regulatory 
schemes possess a number of potential advantages over command and control regulation, 
such as i) proximity (being closer to the industry being regulated); ii) flexibility (absence of 
political and administrative constraints); iii) greater compliance; and iv) greater potential to 
mobilize  resources.  Potential  disadvantages  include  conflicts  of  interest,  inadequate 
enforcement  and  accountability,  and  insufficient  monitoring  of  compliance.  From  the 
perspective of internal governance, Balleisen & Eisner (2009) argue that “the effectiveness of 
private regulation in a particular context – or, more precisely, the potential for credible co-
regulation  –  depends  on  the  following  five  factors:  1)  the  depth  of  concern  for  their 
reputation among regulated businesses; 2) the relevance of flexibility in regulatory detail; 3) 
the  existence  of  sufficient  bureaucratic  capacity  and  autonomy  on  the  part  of 
nongovernmental regulators; 4) the degree of transparency in regulatory process; and 5) the 
seriousness  of  accountability.  Before  legislators or  regulatory  agencies  choose  to  delegate 
regulatory  authority  to  industry  organizations  or  corporations,  they  should  assess  the 
regulatory lay of the land with respect to each of these issues”. 
This  theoretical  approach  enables  a  better  understanding  of  the  diverse  combinations  of 
public and private regulation that can be observed and designed in the real world: from pure 
command and control regulation to hybrid forms of public-private cooperation and ‘new 
approaches’, to purely private schemes (Cafaggi, 2006 and 2010). From this perspective, it 
becomes  clear  that  for  any private  governance scheme to  be  viable  from  a  public  policy 
perspective, regardless of whether it is a spontaneous scheme or a policy-induced scheme, a 
suitable monitoring mechanism must in be in place for public policymakers to be able to 
observe whether the behaviour of private regulators is sufficiently aligned with the public 
interest: the development of a framework for evaluating private governance in the form of 
self- or co-regulatory schemes is the overarching goal of this paper. Section 2 below deals 
with the definition of the key features of private regulation, focusing in particular on the 
effectiveness  dimension.  Section  3  outlines  a  potential  theoretical  framework  for  the 
incorporation of ad hoc assessment tools in the EU policy process.  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REGULATION: MAPPING THE LABYRINTH | 13 
 
2.  Evaluating private governance: a focus on effectiveness 
In  the  past  two  decades,  significant  effort  has  been  devoted  to  the  definition  of  the  key 
features  of  private  governance  schemes,  and  in  particular  those  adopted  within  trans-
national  private  regulation. In  the  academic  literature,  four  key  dimensions  are  normally 
identified (see Cafaggi, 2010): quality, legitimacy, enforcement and effectiveness. Quality is 
normally  measured  in  terms  of  the  traditional  criteria  applied  to  formal  legislation,  i.e. 
certainty,  predictability,  lack  of  ambiguity,  flexibility,  efficacy,  malleability  etc.  These 
potentially  conflicting  requirements  imply that high  quality  norms  will  often  occupy  the 
middle ground between both extremes. Moreover, good-quality private norms should also 
not upset the coherency of existing, usually formal, regulatory system(s).30 
Legitimacy, on the other hand, is often described as referring to the degree of responsiveness, 
inclusiveness  and  representativeness  of  the  private  regulatory scheme. It  includes  both  a 
substantive  and  procedural  dimension.  Authors  have  distinguished  i.a. between  political 
legitimacy and democratic legitimacy (Bernstein, 2011); as well as between input and output 
legitimacy; 31 or  the  emerging  ‘derivative  legitimacy’  in  times  of  extensive  interlinking 
between private regulatory bodies (Kelly, 2008). Established theories of legitimacy consider 
whether  the  organizations  are  representative,  inclusive  and  procedurally  fair.  Private 
regulatory organizations that satisfy the legitimacy criteria articulated in these theories can 
claim legitimacy and expect greater compliance as a result (Curtin & Senden, 2011; Casey & 
Scott, 2011). 
A variety of enforcement mechanisms exist with regard to private norms, such as arbitration, 
mediation, incorporation in court decisions as well as more sociologically informed methods 
(i.e.,  forms  of  peer  pressure,  market-based  strategies  using  reputation  and  ‘naming  and 
shaming’  mechanisms).  Enforcement  is  often  the  outcome  of  complementary  strategies 
deploying  judicial  and  non-judicial  mechanisms  across  different  jurisdictional  levels 
(Cafaggi, 2011a). Moreover, enforcement of private norms must be considered in relation to 
public regulation and public oversight. There is an increasing role of agencies in overseeing 
compliance with transnational standard setting: examples range from accounting standards 
to  advertising,  from  payment  to  food  safety,  from  employment  to  non  discrimination 
standards. To what extent is or should the state be involved in enforcing private norms? 
How do norm conflicts between public and private norms affect the process of enforcement? 
Finally, effectiveness can be defined as the consistency between means and goals and extent to 
which  private  regulation  achieves  its  objectives.  Effectiveness  ‘measures’  ex  ante  the 
proportionality between means and ends and ex post the positive or negative impact of the 
regulatory  measure  over  the  different  constituencies  including  regulated  parties  and 
beneficiaries. It concerns the entire regulatory process from standard-setting to enforcement. 
Effectiveness  can  be  predicated  upon  either private  as  well  as public  norms,  or  as  often 
happens, a combination of both. Indeed, one of the cardinal issue raised in this paper is 
which  type  of  norms,  or  which  combination  of norms  and  institutions  (as  well  as  under 
which circumstances), leads to the highest degree of effectiveness, i.e. the highest degree of 
                                                   
30 A  private  norm  may  be  particularly  effective  and  of  high quality,  yet still  conflict  with  existing 
regulatory regimes, e.g. other private or public regimes. 
31 ‘Input legitimacy’ focuses on the means by which constituents participate in a private regulatory 
scheme, e.g. representation, inclusiveness or process. Output-legitimacy represents those paradigms 
that focus on substantive outcomes, e.g. trade liberalization, or fairness, and whether goals set by the 
private  regulatory  scheme  are  reached.  In  this  respect,  output  legitimacy  is  very  similar  to 
effectiveness.  See  Scharpf  (1999)  and 
http://www.baselgovernance.org/fileadmin/docs/pdfs/Nonstate/Paper-Elsig-Amalric.pdf  14 | CAFAGGI & RENDA 
 
compliance with the stated objectives. Often the correlation between norms and institutions 
is not sufficiently highlighted and effectiveness is measured in relation to norms regardless 
of  the  institutional  framework.  The  OECD  (2011)  approach  suggests  on  the  contrary  that 
effectiveness should be evaluated in the light of an integrated analysis including rules and 
institutions. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  these  four  dimensions  are  tightly  interrelated,  to  the  extent  that 
disentangling  them  can  prove  very  challenging.  To  be  sure,  there  are  significant 
interdependencies  between  them:  legitimacy  can  foster  compliance,  which  facilitates 
enforcement  and  ultimately  increases  effectiveness;  effectiveness,  in  turn,  contributes  to 
legitimacy  (so-called  ‘output’  legitimacy).  However,  this  interrelation  includes  important 
conflicts  and  trade-offs:  for  example,  improving  legitimacy  through  representation,  voice 
and accountability can in some cases undermine effectiveness by increasing transaction and 
compliance costs, slowing down the regulatory process, diluting enforcement and ossifying 
private rules.32 In other circumstances higher efficiency reducing externalities can improve 
legitimacy.  
From the viewpoint of a participant to a private regulatory scheme, the key dimension is 
effectiveness, defined as the extent to which the organization achieves its own stated goals. 
This, in turn, can be obtained through high-quality norms that are strongly enforced, and 
through a high degree of legitimacy. Legitimacy, in turn, can increase the likelihood that 
other participants will respect the rules of the private organization: in this respect, legitimacy 
can transform private rules into ‘focal points’, thence reducing transaction costs and making 
the success of an organization more likely.33  
The effectiveness of private regulation can be described in analytical terms as a function of 
output, outcome and impact (Easton, 1965; Fuchs, 2006), plus broader political and socio-
economic  effects  (Fuchs  and  Kalfagianni,  2010  and  Dingwerth  &  Pattberg,  2006).  More 
precisely, the output is the direct result of the activity carried out by the private regulatory 
scheme, such as a standard, a set of rules or a specific policy. The outcome refers to the 
overall  regulatory  objectives,  including  the  behavioural  changes  of  regulated  and  third 
parties  that  occur  as  a  result  of  the  activity undertaken.  Finally,  if  one  looks  also  at  the 
broader social, economic and environmental consequences of the activity carried out by the 
private regulators, then the ‘impact’ of private regulation emerges. These determinants of 
effectiveness can in turn be broken down based on their main drivers. Accordingly, output 
can be described along the dimensions of stringency and comprehensiveness,34 outcome can 
be  explained  through  the  degree  of  compliance  with  the  rules,  the  participation  of 
stakeholders (inclusiveness, representativeness) and the existence of potential lock-in effects 
due, e.g. to reliance on one specific standard in a context of quick technological development. 
Finally, the impact of a private regulatory scheme refers to its added value in achieving its 
objectives compared to the counterfactual, i.e. the next best alternative to that form of private 
regulatory scheme. Beyond the impact of private regulation in terms of ‘problem-solving’, 
some  authors  (Dingwerth  &  Pattberg,  2007;  Kalfagianni  &  Pattberg,  2010)  have  further 
                                                   
32 See partly Kelly (2008). On the concept of ossification, see McGarity (1987) and Cafaggi (2011a). 
33 See Kalfagianni & Pattberg (2010), quoting also Cutler et al. (1999).  
34 Stringency,  as  reported  in  Fuchs  and  Kalfagianni  (2010),  refers  to  the  degree  to  which  a  given 
private governance scheme requires actors to implement behavioural changes (Auld et al., 2008). At 
the  same  time,  stringency differs  according  to whether management-system-based or  performance 
standards are adopted, and the ambition of performance standards (Fuchs, 2006). PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REGULATION: MAPPING THE LABYRINTH | 15 
 
distinguished between measures of success such as: material and structural effects, cognitive 
effects, and normative effects.35  
When  looking  at  the  interface  between  public  and  private  regulation,  however,  these 
concepts  are  not  sufficient  to  provide  policymakers  with  a  comprehensive  theoretical 
framework. 36 In  particular,  public  policymakers  are  normally  interested  in  a  different 
outcome, which certainly encompasses, but is not limited to, legitimacy and effectiveness.37 
From a transaction cost politics perspective (see section 1.2 above), public policy-makers will 
opt for delegating the solution of a given policy problem to private regulation whenever this 
represents the most ‘effective’ way to achieve that goal. However, this notion of effectiveness 
(defined  as  the  extent  to  which  private  regulatory  schemes  achieve  socially  optimal  or 
desirable outcomes38) may be different from the one sought by private actors involved in 
private regulatory schemes. Occasionally, these two notions of effectiveness can coincide; but 
in many instances they may diverge – hence the scepticism of many social scientists when it 
comes to evaluating private regulation.  
Cases in which ‘private’ and ‘social’ effectiveness diverge can be of many different types. For 
example,  collective  action  in  private  regulatory  bodies  can  aim  at  socially  sub-optimal 
outcomes.  For  example,  a  cartel  can  be  very  effective  in  achieving  its  stated  goal  but 
externalize costs on third parties.39 Participants would join the cartel to the extent that they 
think the cartel is likely to be successful, i.e. would achieve its goal of increasing participants’ 
profits  without  being  uncovered  by  antitrust  authorities.  However,  from  a  public  policy 
perspective a cartel is undesirable since it leads to restrictions of output and/or increases in 
price levels, to the detriment of consumers and often also other actors along the value chain.  
                                                   
35 Kalfagianni & Pattberg (2010) refer to first-order and second-order effects to distinguish between 
impacts and material, cognitive and normative effects. 
36 It  is  important  to  observe  that  different  private  governance  schemes  can  define  effectiveness  in 
different ways: for example, emerging definitions given by ISEAL and the GFSI differ noticeably from 
the  ones  given  by  multi-national  corporations  for  the  purposes  of  their  own  CSR  activity.  But 
generally, one can say that effectiveness is always defined as the ability of a given private governance 
scheme to achieved its own statutory goal.  
37 Effectiveness is not commonly used in ex ante RIA, although recently the European Commission has 
started using effectiveness as a criterion against which to rank and discard options before a more in-
depth  analysis.  In  this  context,  effectiveness  is  used  in  combination  with  other  two  criteria 
(“efficiency” and “coherence”). To the contrary, the notion of “effectiveness” in public policy appraisal 
is mostly used in ex post evaluation, where the quality and performance of a given piece of legislation 
is  appraised  in terms of “relevance”  (i.e.  the extent to which  the  objectives  of  public  intervention 
proved appropriate with respect to the funds available, the needs perceived and the specific problems 
the intervention was meant to solve); “efficiency” (i.e. “cost-effectiveness”, or how economically have 
the various inputs been converted into outputs and results and whether the expected effects have been 
obtained  at  a reasonable  cost);  “usefulness”  (i.e. whether the  impacts  achieved  by  an  intervention 
correspond to the needs and problems identified at the outset); and finally “effectiveness” (i.e. the 
extent to which the effects of a given programme have contributed to the achievement of the specific 
objectives of the intervention. 
38 This is why effectiveness is normally linked to explicitly stated general, specific and operational 
objectives in the ex ante IAs of the European Commission. The specification of objectives has become 
much more common in Commission IAs over the past few years, and the Communication on smart 
regulation of October 2010 placed even more emphasis on the need to define “SMART” objectives in 
ex ante policy appraisal documents, so that achievement of those objectives can be monitored over 
time, including in ex post evaluation.  
39 See Maher (2011). 16 | CAFAGGI & RENDA 
 
A more general case is that of negative externalities, i.e. cases in which the coordination of 
activities  between  members  of  a  private  regulatory  scheme  leads  to  non-internalized 
negative effects on non-members, even if such effects are unintentional. This is even more 
likely  to  be  the  case  whenever  the  governance of  private  regulatory  organizations  is  not 
inclusive  of  all  potentially  affected  stakeholders  –  as  we  explain  in  section  2  below, 
GlobalGap is an example of under-representation of developing countries, which end up 
being negatively affected by the activity of the private regulatory body.  
Another  problem  may  emerge  whenever  the  scope  of  the  private  regulatory  scheme  is 
narrower than the impacts generated by the activity of its participants: for example private 
regulation  aimed  at  compliance  with  safety  standards  might  have,  say,  unintended 
environmental consequences; private regulation of Internet security standards might affect 
the users’ freedom of expression or their right to privacy (Cafaggi, 2011b).  
Finally, there might be cases in which the private regulatory scheme is aimed at achieving 
socially desirable outcomes, but either adverse selection problems or lack of monitoring and 
compliance lead to the emerge of socially undesirable outcomes. An example is provided by 
Lennox  &  Nash  (2003),  who  describe  the  Responsible  Care  initiative  launched  by  the 
Chemical Manufacturer’s Association (CMA) in 1989 in response to growing public criticism 
of the industry: the fact that the CMA did not require third party review or certification of 
firm performance and did not adopt explicit sanctions for non-compliance led to a perverse 
situation in which participants in Responsible Care were more polluting on average than 
other  chemical  firms  in  the  United  States. 40 Similarly,  Morgenstern  &  Pizer  (2007)  in 
reviewing a number of voluntary programs in the environmental field express concern on 
the self-selection of participants into those schemes.  
The potential misalignment between private benefits and social welfare can be addressed by 
designing  appropriate  indicators  that  would  make  ex ante  clear  when  regulatory  choices 
pursue one or the other strategy. Some sectoral experiences (advertising, environment) and 
some general guidelines (GRI, ISEAL) suggest that two families of indicators can provide 
guidance  to  align  private  benefits  and  social  welfare:  governance  and  performance 
indicators.  For  example  governance  indicators  may  refer  to  the  separation  of  functions 
between standard setting, monitoring and enforcement. Private regulators that concentrate 
the functions in one single body tend to maximize private benefits exacerbating conflicts of 
interest  between  regulators  and  the  regulated;  those  which  separate  them  by  creating 
independent  monitors  and  enforcers  increase  the  chances  of  internal  conflict  but  open 
themselves  to  external  voice  ensuring  higher  level  of  transparency.  Evidence  shows  that 
separation can also help regulatory dialogue when private enforcers send signals to standard 
setters  about  problems  concerning  compliance  rather  than  focus  on  punishment  of  the 
infringers.41  
Regulatory  objectives  can  be  complex  and  sometimes  conflicting.  Conflicts  may  arise 
between private benefits and social welfare and even within social welfare when different 
                                                   
40 M. Lennox and J. Nash (2003), “Industry Self-Regulation and Adverse Selection”, Business Strategy 
and the Environment, 12: 1-14. Responsible Care has operated up to now without explicit sanctions for 
malfeasance.  As  a result,  it  has reportedly  fallen  victim  to  enough  opportunism  that  it  includes a 
disproportionate  number  of  poor  performers,  and  its  members  do  not  improve  faster  than  non-
members. Thus, the institutional pressure that Responsible Care exerts on its members appears to 
have inadequately counteracted opportunism. Since Responsible Care represents a leading example of 
self-regulation in the world, our findings highlight the difficulty of creating self-regulation without 
explicit sanctions. 
41 See F. Cafaggi (ed.) (2012), The enforcement of transnational regulation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
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distributional outcomes may be generated by alternative regulatory strategies. Performance 
indicators can contribute to define ex ante distributional effects singling out winners and 
losers  or  benefits  and  costs  of  a  specific  regulatory  measure.  By  highlighting  these 
consequences they empower the regulator with information to make informed choices about 
conflicting objectives.42  
Besides  these  ‘genetic  problems’,  which  depend  on  statutory  goals,  the  selection  of 
participants and the multi-stakeholder nature of the initiative, a number of other effects can 
undermine  the  alignment  between  private  benefits  and  social  goals  during  the  life  of  a 
private regulatory body. Below, we briefly list them: 
  Lock-in effects and collective action problems can occur when members remain locked 
into suboptimal agreements and ‘focal points’, with no incentive to change;  
  Path dependency, status quo bias, anchoring and framing effects may lead to shifting 
focus towards measurable and immediate benefits rather than long-term social welfare; 
  Hard-to-detect changes over time might be induced by the prevalence of some interests 
over others during the life of the private regulatory body (e.g. MSC, see below) 
  Divergence of interests between the regulators and the regulated, which lead the former 
to prefer short-term actions that maximize their likelihood of being re-appointed;  
  Self-indulgence  in  the  evaluation  of  private  regulatory  bodies,  when  governance 
arrangements entail self-evaluation, or lack of legitimacy of third parties in charge of 
evaluation.  
All these problems deserve careful scrutiny before one can actually conclude that a given 
policy issue is a good candidate for efficient and socially effective private regulation.43 
3.  Towards a theoretical framework for the appraisal of private 
governance schemes 
The fact that private governance schemes can feature limited alignment with public policy 
goals raises the issue of how to evaluate them, when, and how. Again, from our ‘transaction 
cost politics’ approach, the evaluation phase of policymaking can be performed centrally by 
government, or delegated to specific agencies, or even externalized to private governance 
schemes themselves, or private meta-regulators. In all these hypotheses, independence is a 
key factor to ensure effectiveness. As a matter of fact, there seems to be a lot more self-
evaluation  by  private  regulators  today,  than  external  evaluation  by  public  policymakers. 
This creates concern, since there is evidence that private regulators, in many circumstances, 
                                                   
42 David Vogel (2010) has recently looked at this notion of effectiveness in the field of CSR, by arguing: 
“When compared to most government regulations in developed countries, civil regulation is clearly 
less effective. In fact, civil regulations exhibit many of the well-documented shortcomings of industry 
self-regulation at the national level, with whom they share many important characteristics (Lennox & 
Nash,  2003;  Morgenstern  &  Pizer,  2007).  Both  remain  weaker  than  well-enforced  command  and 
control regulations in forcing corporations to change their behaviour … But the effectiveness of civil 
regulations is roughly comparable to that of many intergovernmental treaties and agreements, whose 
effectiveness  in  addressing  environmental  protection,  labour  practices,  and  human  rights  is  also 
mixed and uneven … [and] civil regulations are undoubtedly more effective than the labour, human 
rights, and environmental regulations of many developing countries.” 
43 For example, Ashby et al. (2004) distinguished a number of voluntary regulatory schemes in the UK 
based on the different context in which they emerge, which in turn determines a different mode of 
strategic interaction between private players. Accordingly, they define the UK advertising Code as an 
Assurance Game, the UK Press as a Chicken game and the UK Life Insurance as a Prisoner’s Dilemma. 18 | CAFAGGI & RENDA 
 
can have limited incentives to fully self-evaluate their effectiveness from a social welfare 
perspective. At the same time, concerns become even bigger since the use of RIA and ex post 
evaluation  tools  to  assess  the  effectiveness  of  private  governance  schemes  appears  very 
limited and unsophisticated. 
Examples  are  found  in  a  number  of  fields.  For  example,  corporate  social  responsibility 
(CSR)  reporting  is  today  an  enormous  success  as  well  as  a  profitable  business  for 
intermediaries and assurance consultants that help companies comply with internationally 
established  standards. 44  Business  codes  such  as  the  Business  Charter  for  Sustainable 
Development developed by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) are followed by 
thousands  of  companies.45 Against  this  background,  the  Global  Reporting Initiative  (GRI) 
sustainability reporting is perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to establish complex and 
meaningful international standards for the respect of sustainable development principles46. 
However,  even  if  it  appears  as  the  prototype  of  an  open,  inclusive  organization  whose 
mandate  and  statutory  objectives  are  aligned  with  public  policy  goals,  its  performance 
exhibited  so  far  remarkable  problems  that  are  relevant  from  a  public  policy  perspective 
(Vogel, 2010; Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; Brown et al., 2009; Fonseca, 2010; Wood, 2006). In 
addition, the formalistic nature of indicators has reportedly led to the emergence of box-
ticking behaviours on the side of companies participating to the reporting scheme; in the case 
of  key  aspects  of  sustainability,  such  as  human  rights,  this  has  so  far  created  enormous 
problems.47 Even more worryingly, the concerns expressed by stakeholders as regards the 
inclusiveness and external effectiveness of the current GRI-G3 set of indicators do not seem 
to have been the focus of a real reflection inside GRI, if not limited to the organization’s 
generic  commitment  towards  constant  improvement.  The  consequence  of  this  rising 
discontent  seems  to  be  the  creation  of  an  additional  organization,  the  International 
Integrated  Reporting  Committee,  with  the  aim  to  create  a  globally  accepted  reporting 
framework that enables organizations to combine financial and non-financial disclosures.  
In  the  field  of  trade,  the  Base  Code  of  the  Ethical  Trading  Initiative  (ETI)  is  today  the 
globally accepted benchmark of many workplace labour standards: in 2009 is applied to 9.4 
million workers at 34,720 supplier sites. Its enforcement and evaluation proceeds through 
inspections at the workplace, and ETI members are required to monitor compliance at their 
supplier sites against each Base Code Provision. Despite being a successful initiative, also 
thanks  to  the  official  endorsement  of  the  UK  DFID,48 ETI  still  features  difficulties  in  the 
                                                   
44 As reported by Vogel (2010), “more than 3,000 global firms now regularly issue reports on the social 
and  environmental  practices  and  many  of  these  firms  have  developed  their  own  codes  and/or 
subscribe  to  one  or  more  industry  or  cross-industry  codes”.  See  Wood,  at  276-277  for  a  detailed 
description of the emergence of environmental reporting.  
45 For  interesting  accounts  of  the  emergence  of  voluntary  codes  in  the  field  of  corporate  social 
responsibility, see i.a. Wood (2006).  
46 The GRI is a private transnational body that has produced the leading standard for sustainability 
reporting,  used  by  more  than  three-quarters  of  the  Global  Fortune  250  companies.  Its  guidelines 
include  79  indicators  for  corporations  to  report  on  their  social,  environmental,  and  economic 
performance 
47 Fonseca (2010) has carried out an empirical analysis among stakeholders to collect feedback on their 
level  of  satisfaction  with  the  GRI  scheme,  finding  evidence  of  an  excessive  focus  on  internal 
organisational performance, rather than external impacts; a lack of integrated indicators; a “credibility 
gap” due to the discretion left to reporting firms as to whether to rely on internal or external assurance 
and verification; a worrying lack of guidance on stakeholder engagement, which ultimately results in 
limited participation and lack of real inclusiveness. 
48 ETI was initially funded by the UK DFID. Although ETI aims at long-term financial independence, 
funding from DFID has increased in the past years, and accounted for 40.1% of the organization’s PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REGULATION: MAPPING THE LABYRINTH | 19 
 
assessment  of  corporate  behaviour,  problems  of  representation  of  stakeholder  groups 
(especially with respect to the ‘North-South’ divide and the representation of workers, see 
Hale, 2000 and Hale & Shaw, 2001); unequal power structures between UK retailers and 
suppliers from developing countries (Hughes, 2001); and the persistence of imbalances of 
bargaining power between corporations, workers and trade unions (Schaller, 2007). In any 
case, it is difficult to assess whether ETI is being evaluated from the standpoint of its social 
impacts: internal governance appears very balanced but also inevitably loose, with no strong 
monitoring and sanction mechanisms linked to any measure of external effectiveness.  
In food retail, since the 1990s (also due to scandals such as the BSE, or mad cow disease) 
multi-national corporations and international organizations have intensified their dialogue 
to create global safety standards. Private regulatory schemes such as i.a. IFOAM, the Global 
Food Safety Initiative, the Sustainable Agriculture Network and the Global Partnership for 
Good  Agricultural  Practice  (GlobalGAP);  and  sectoral  initiatives  such  as  the  Forestry 
Stewardship  Council,  the  Marine  Stewardship  Council,  the  Aquaculture  Certification 
Council,  etc.  have  increasingly  permeated  the  supply  chain.  However,  problems  have 
emerged due to divergences between the private benefit of members, and the social impacts 
of these initiatives. For example, in evaluating GlobalGAP,49 Fuchs & Kalfagianni (2010) have 
described a very Europe-dominated, business-dominated private regulatory scheme, with 
outstanding problems in terms of: i) limited inclusiveness; ii) a very limited participation of 
external stakeholders;  iii)  a  very geographically  biased  representation  in  decision-making 
bodies;  iv)  a  trade-off  between stringency  and uptake  (GlobalGAP  had  to  release  certain 
requirements in order to elicit more participation); v) a lack of detail, which makes a true 
evaluation of progress achieved impossible;50 vi) a lack of progress tracking in terms of the 
                                                                                                                                                               
income in 2009. DFID assesses the merit of its PPA with ETI also on the basis of specific indicators. 
This, however, takes place merely through a self-assessment document filed by ETI. It is important to 
reflect on the peculiar type of public-private interaction that takes place between DFID and ETI: the 
fact  that  a  public  body  oversees  (though  through  self-assessment)  and  significantly  contributes 
financially to a private regulatory scheme makes the ETI a hybrid type of institution, and more similar 
to a public-private partnership than to a full-fledged private regulation. That said, the endorsement 
(de facto and through funding) of the DFID seems to have encouraged trust and participation by all 
types of stakeholders, including businesses, trade unions and international organizations. ETI now 
counts 64 companies, 9 trade unions, and 15 NGOs and specifically looks at respect for workers’ rights 
and the maintenance of decent working conditions. 
49 GlobalGap was developed in 1997 by a group of European retailers. Initially focused on fruits and 
vegetables, it now covers meat products and fish from aquaculture as well. Businesses wishing to 
acquire certification with GlobalGAP are required to comply with a detailed checklist of 254 questions, 
divided into 41 ‘‘major musts’’, 122 ‘‘minor musts’’ and 91 ‘‘shoulds’’ (recommended criteria). In 2008, 
it had 94,000 certified producers, up from 18,000 in 2004, representing an increase of approximately 80 
percent. More than 20 countries joined in 2008. In total, over 85 countries are represented. There is 
significant growth within European countries, particularly due to French and German supermarkets 
managing to reach out to more producers (GlobalGAP 2009, 21.09.09). Significant growth is also seen 
within countries that hold a (major) global supply position in produce, mainly South Africa and Chile. 
Smaller  growth  is  observed  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  Central  America  and  some  African 
countries (ibid.). 
50 This is the case for i.a. environmental well-being indicators such as the quality of irrigation water 
(except  for  sewage  water  which  is  a  major  must  in  all  versions),  recycling  and  re-use,  impact  of 
farming on the environment and wildlife and conservation policies, while constituted minor musts in 
2001, are mere recommendations in 2004 and remain so today (see also van der Grijp et al., 2005). This 
has occurred in other private initiatives, such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), where the 
participation of big retailers led to the introduction of varying levels of stringency in the FSC due to 
the inability to meet the market demand of their supply chains (van Waarden, 2010). 20 | CAFAGGI & RENDA 
 
evaluation of ‘external’ effectiveness; and vii) a potentially negative impact on competition 
and local firms (in Africa, several companies reportedly had to close their business due to the 
impossibility to match GlobalGAP standards). The European Commission also found that 
GlobalGAP imposes disproportionate costs on operators in developing countries.51  
Also more sectoral initiatives such as the FSC and the MSC have been heavily criticized in 
the past years. Despite their attempts to signal attention for external impacts, they have met 
with  increasing  skepticism  on  the  side  of  stakeholders.  The  FSC,  in  particular,  has  been 
extensively reviewed in the academic literature, which showed that the initial thrust towards 
forest  preservation  has  gradually  shifted  due  to  growing  capture  by  business  interests, 
geographic imbalances and reduced de facto representation of NGOs and other stakeholders.  
3.1  The rise of private meta-regulators 
The  growing  importance  of  private  regulation  in  fields  such  as  sustainability  and  food 
quality and safety, coupled with the rising concerns that such organizations do not fully 
pursue  public  goals,  recently  led  to  the  creation  of  meta-organizations  and  –  even  more 
recently  –  meta-standardization  as  a  way  to  bridge  the  gap  between  private  regulatory 
schemes  and  public  policymakers.  An  important  example  in  this  respect  is  certainly  the 
ISEAL Alliance, an international non-profit organisation that codifies best practices for the 
design  and  implementation  of  social  and  environmental  standards  initiatives.  This  is  a 
landmark example of what we call a ‘private meta-regulator’.52 In its activity as a ‘standard 
for standards’, the ISEAL alliance develops codes of good practice that seem to be reaching 
out  to  international  organization  and  important  supranational  institutions.  Important 
recognitions have come recently from the European Commission in its Communication on 
Fair  Trade  (2009);  from  the  UNCTAD  Recommendations  of  the  conference  “Making 
Sustainability  Standards  Work  for  Small-scale  Farmers”;  from  the  European  Parliament’s 
resolution on “Corporate Social Responsibility: Implementing the Partnership for Growth 
and Jobs”53; from the WWF/World Bank “Forest Certification Assessment Guide” published 
in 2006; and from FAO’s Guidelines on Ecolabelling of Marine Fishery Products (2005). The 
                                                   
51 See SEC(2009)670, 28 May 2009: “Costs and benefits of participating in the GLOBALGAP assurance 
scheme to operators in developing countries have been estimated for Kenya, Zambia and Uganda. In 
general, the studies conclude that small-scale growers need external support (by donors or exporters) 
to be able to afford certification, costs of which in the case of Kenya are in the range of 636 GBP for 
establishment and 175 GBP per annum to maintain. In Zambia, establishment costs per grower even 
amounted  to  4664  GBP  for  initial  investment  and  938  GBP  per  annum  for  maintenance  costs.  In 
Uganda, the study concludes that an export company would have to sell an additional 53 tonnes of 
horticultural  products to  break  even  (18% more  for a company  exporting  300  tonnes  per  annum). 
Farmers would have to increase their production by about 0.1 to 0.3 acres to compensate for additional 
costs through higher net income.” 
52 ISEAL Alliance members includes both the FSC and the MSC, who committed to compliance with 
the Code of ISEAL Good Practice. Other founding members include Fairtrade Labelling Organizations 
International  (FLO), the  International  Federation  of Organic Agriculture  Movements  (IFOAM),  the 
International  Organic  Accreditation  Service  (IOAS);  the  Marine  Aquarium  Council  (MAC);  the 
Rainforest  Alliance;  Social  Accountability  International  (SAI);  Social  Accountability  Accreditation 
Services (SAAS), the Union for Ethical BioTrade (UEBT) and UTZ Certified. To become a full member 
of the  ISEAL Alliance,  members  have  to demonstrate  full  compliance  with  ISEAL  Codes  of Good 
Practice  and  other  applicable  ISO  Guides  (e.g.  ISO17011  for  Accreditation  Bodies).  Organisations 
interested  in  membership  will  first  apply  for  Associate  Membership,  and  have  to  successfully 
complete  a  pre-assessment.  ISEAL  has  historically  relied  upon  three  sources  of  funding  – 
governmental  agencies,  foundations  and  membership  fees.  It  works  in  partnership  with 
AccountAbility and PwC Germany to improve its global outreach. 
53 Resolution P6_TA(2007)0062, 2007). PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REGULATION: MAPPING THE LABYRINTH | 21 
 
European  Environmental  Bureau  (2010)  declared  in  2010  that  they  “consider  [ISEAL's 
Standard-Setting Code] a model of reference for multi-stakeholder processes, especially in 
the area of public policy implementation”.  
Besides  a  Standard-Setting  code  and  an  Assurance  Code,  recently  the  ISEAL  alliance 
launched an important tool that goes in the direction of an evaluation of the external impact 
of private regulatory bodies. The Code of Good Practice for Assessing the Impacts of Social 
and  Environmental  Standard  (‘Impacts  Code’)  sets  out  the  process  by  which  standards 
systems can provide evidence of their contributions to social and environmental impacts as 
well as learning about and improving the effectiveness of their system. Interestingly, the 
Code  appears  strikingly  similar  to  an  Impact  Assessment  guidance  developed  by  public 
policymakers.54  
Figure  3  below  shows  the  theoretical  framework  for  evaluation  proposed  by  the  ISEAL 
Impacts Code, which mirrors existing methods of ex post evaluation of projects, expenditure 
programmes and policies by public bodies. For example, the MSC has recently launched a 
consultation on the evaluation of its effectiveness and outcomes based on the ISEAL code55. 
There, the MSC has proposed to use the ISEAL Impacts Code, by identifying specific goals 
and issues for its own sector.  
Figure 3. Methodology for the evaluation based on the ISEAL code 
 
Source: ISEAL Impacts Code. 
The development of an Impacts Code on the side of the ISEAL Alliance certainly fills a gap in 
the  international  policy  and  global governance debate,  which  culminates  in  the  lack  of  a 
suitable definition of sustainability. In this respect, ISEAL has gone even further by engaging 
with  the  Food  and  Agriculture  Organization  (FAO)  in  the  quest  for  a  globally  accepted 
definition  of sustainability.  As  a  matter  of  fact, while  the  ISEAL  Impacts  Code primarily 
looks at the stakeholder of a given private governance scheme (e.g. the MSC), the conceptual 
                                                   
54 Users can find definitions, glossaries, methodologies and tips for use of data sources and monitoring 
and evaluation arrangements. For example, the Code explains that the evaluation “could also be an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the standards system, either in respect of its internal structure (e.g. 
financial management) or of its ability to provide tangible benefits and incentives (e.g. fair prices) for 
its participants”, thus to some extent mirroring our definition of “private benefit” v. “social welfare”. 
55  http://www.msc.org/about-us/consultations/current-consultations/monitoring-and-evalua-ting-
the-impacts-of-the-msc-certification-programme/Consultation%20document%20  Monitoring%20-
%20evaluation%20consultation%20document.pdf  22 | CAFAGGI & RENDA 
 
framework  definition  provided  by  ISEAL  aims  to  represent  a  “universally  applicable 
definition of sustainability” (see FAO-ISEAL, 2010). This development – termed within the 
ISEAL  Alliance  ‘scaling-up’  of  their  current  efforts  –  corresponds  to  a  long-term  plan  to 
involve  public  and  private  organizations  and  trigger  a  common  definition  of  core 
sustainability  values,  starting  from  the  Brundtland  Commission’s  report  of  1987  “Our 
Common Future” and continuing with the incorporation of previous voluntary certification 
systems (FLO, MSC, UTZ Certified); tools generated by UN bodies (UN/ECOSOC, FAO, 
ILO, UNEP, etc.); corporations (e.g. WalMart Sustainability Index); NGOs (e.g. Transparency 
International, the Bellagio STAMP); and academia (e.g. the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Report by the 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress).  
Within this context, a definition of sustainability has emerged, which can be considered at 
the moment among the most sophisticated and widely acknowledged definition to be used 
for public policy purposes. More in detail, sustainability has been articulated along four key 
dimensions/preconditions: good  governance; social  development;  environmental  integrity 
and economic resilience. Good governance includes both ‘active participation’ indicators – 
i.e. reflecting the degree of active participation by interested parties in local management and 
decision-making  –  and  ‘transparency’  indicators,  including  indicators  on  the  three  core 
dimensions  of  Assessment,  Prevention  of  Corruption  and  Compliance).56 The  ‘economic 
resilience’  indicators,  on  the  other  hand,  incorporate  dimensions  of  ‘secure  livelihoods’ 
(including poverty alleviation and measured as on average per capita income of the farm, 
forestry,  or  fishery  enterprise);  resilience  to  economic  risk  (measured  as  degree  of 
diversification of funding sources); inclusivity of the value chain and various social capital 
indicators. ‘Social development’ encompasses a wide array of sub-indicators, from right to 
food and use of resources to labour rights, non-discrimination and equity (including gender 
equality), access to education and knowledge, health and access to sanitation and respect for 
cultural identity. Finally, the ‘environmental integrity’ dimension looks at impacts on air, 
water, land and soil, biodiversity, climate change and eco-efficiency.  
Based on this definition of sustainability, and thanks to the original initiative of ISEAL, FAO 
has been able to start a very ambitious process of consolidation of existing labels and private 
standards into a common theoretical framework for the assessment of the sustainability of 
food and agricultural schemes. More in detail, FAO has explained that companies active in 
these sectors and wishing to ensure they achieve minimum levels of sustainability should 
follow a number of mandatory steps, as illustrated in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Steps in sustainability management 
 
Source: FAO (2012) 
                                                   
56 The latter indicators are tentatively based on the availability of social-economic and environmental 
information  relating  to  the  business,  enterprise  or  policy  intervention,  including  monitoring  data, 
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The  joint  FAO-ISEAL  definition  of  sustainability  indicators  is  certainly  still  an  ongoing 
exercise, as testified by the many definitions that are still pending. However, it represents at 
once a promising avenue for public-private cooperation in global governance, and also the 
implicit  recognition  that  private  governance  can  significantly  contribute  to  the  design, 
implementation and enforcement of tools that aim at pursuing public policy objectives. The 
spider graph developed by FAO and ISEAL (Figure 4 below) shows the relative strengths of 
NGOs,  government  and  businesses  on  the  various  indicators  of  sustainability  described 
above. The figure shows, in particular, that key governance indicators such as participation, 
transparency and ongoing assessment are more likely to fall in the remit of governments, 
rather than NGOs and businesses.  
Figure 4. Relative commitment and strength for sustainability 
 
Source: FAO-ISEAL (2010). 
The making of SAFA: towards a theoretical evaluation model? 
Within this general framework, FAO has decided to elaborate on the joint work with ISEAL 
and  involve  stakeholders  in  the  development  of  detailed  guidelines  for  the  two  ‘assess’ 
phases  in  Table  1,  i.e.  the  ex  ante  sustainability  assessment,  and  the  ex  post  monitoring, 
progress-tracking and evaluation. This set of guidelines, still in the making, is known under 
the acronym SAFA, i.e. Sustainability Assessment of Food and Agriculture systems. In order 
to develop SAFA, in 2010 FAO mapped all sustainability indicators for the food sector and 
compiled  a  list  of  performance  indicators,  based  on  the  review  of  dozens  of  corporate 
responsibility, social and environmental standards and sustainability reports of food chain 
actors. This resulted in a revised list of draft sustainability goals and scope, and was the basis 
of a first e-forum with stakeholders, which eventually involved 246 people from 61 countries. 
Later, in mid-2011, FAO asked the Swiss College of Agriculture and the Research Institute 
for Organic Agriculture (FiBL) to undertake a SAFA stakeholder survey, which targeted field 
experts  from  the  food  and  agriculture  industry,  public  administrations,  NGOs,  multi-
stakeholder roundtables and multilateral institutions. This led, in the second half of 2011 to a 
cross-comparison  of  standards  and  indicator  which  addressed  44  systems  (18  industry 
standards,  5  farm-level systems,  4  systems  of  multilateral  institutions,  7  NGO systems,  5 
roundtable standards and 5 other systems).  
In  the  occasion  of  the  second  e-Forum  in  January  2012,  which  still  revealed  a  degree  of 
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which are currently being revised by a group of experts. The structure of the current SAFA 
guidelines draws mostly upon ISO 14040:2006, the ISEAL Code of Good Practice and the 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines and the Food Sector Supplement of the GRI. The SAFA 
guidelines, though voluntary, appear very close to ‘real’ impact assessment guidelines, from 
a number of aspects. First, they are based on core principles. Just like the Mandelkern report 
in  the  EU  set  seven  core  principles  for  better  regulation  (necessity,  proportionality, 
subsidiarity, transparency, accountability, accessibility and simplicity), the SAFA guidelines 
are  based  on  six  methodological  principles:  relevance,  simplicity,  cost  efficiency,  goal 
orientation, performance orientation and transparency.  
Second,  the  SAFA  guidelines  are  comprehensive,  i.e.  they  look  at  social,  environmental, 
economic and governance aspects of sustainability in the targeted sector. More in detail, the 
guidelines  lead  to  an  assessment  of  economic  resilience, social  well-being,  environmental 
integrity, and good governance indicators. The guidelines are disseminated with advice on 
existing  methodologies  that  allow  for  quantification  of  impacts,  just  like  the  European 
Commission’s impact assessment guidelines. But in the SAFA guidelines, methods covered 
include frameworks developed within the private regulation contest (e.g. by IFOAM and the 
FSC);  governance  indicators  focus  especially  on  OECD  good  corporate  governance 
principles, the UN Principles for Responsible Investment, and the UN Global Compact, and 
cover mostly accountability, fairness, evaluation (including transparency), participation and 
rule of law. 
Third, the SAFA guidelines are conceived to lead self-evaluators step-by-step. The first phase 
of goal definition is coupled with the definition of system boundaries and key indicators and 
thresholds,  which  will  then  be  used  in  assessing  the  performance  of the  given  system  at 
hand. The following steps, i.e. data collection and analysis, interpretation and reporting, are 
described in less detail. But what is more important is that the SAFA guidelines attempt to 
define  a  set  of  indicators  for  each  of  the sub-categories  covered  (see Figure  5,  left  part), 
coupling  them  with  minimum  requirements  and  threshold  values  to  assess  performance. 
Values  are  set  in  a  way  that  enable  a  traffic  light  assessment  ranging  from  green  (best 
performance) to red (insufficient performance). Finally, the result of the evaluation can be 
visualized  as  in  Figure  5  below,  in  which  the  sample  company  performs  very  well  in 
dimensions such as rule of law, participation, material cycles, product quality and capacity 
building, but performs insufficiently especially when it comes to preserving biodiversity.  
Figure 5. Dimensions covered by SAFA and example of result of an evaluation 
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As of now, the final text of the SAFA Guidelines is expected in early June 2012, and will be 
followed by two pilot applications by students of the University of Hohenheim (Germany), 
followed by other pilots after the Earth Summit in Rio. The results of the pilot testing will 
feed into another revision of the SAFA Guidelines in 2013. 
3.2  Towards a theoretical evaluation model 
The  previous  sections  have  described  the  rise  of  transnational  private  regulation  as  a 
dominant  paradigm  in  several  policy  domains;  the  absence  of  a  real  framework  for  the 
evaluation  of  these  governance  schemes  by  public  policymakers;  and  the  ongoing  ‘gap-
filling’ by meta-regulators that help private organizations set their own goals and converge 
towards  public  policy  objectives.  In  all  this,  the  informational  asymmetries  that  remain 
between private players and public policymakers suggest that it would not be efficient, on 
the side of public policy, to abdicate the task of monitoring and evaluation and to delegate it 
entirely  to  private  meta-regulators.  Evidence  from  past  experience  (e.g.,  the  FSC, 
GlobalGAP)  suggests  that  the  role  of  public  policymakers  should  remain  crucial  in  the 
context of global governance of key areas such as the ones mentioned in this paper (food, 
sustainability, fundamental rights, financial markets, IT, etc.). 
The evaluation of private governance schemes in public regulation can take place in different 
phases of the policy cycle. When self- or co-regulatory schemes are proposed in response to 
action  by  public  policymakers,  of  course  they  will  form  part  of  the  available  regulatory 
options to be compared in an ex ante RIA. However, as already clarified, this is not always 
the case: many private governance schemes are created independently of public regulation, 
and this leads commentators to often exclude the possibility that a systematic monitoring of 
private governance by public regulators could ever take place. At the same time, there might 
be cases in which scrutiny by a regional or national policymaker is not very helpful, due to 
the global nature of private governance arrangements.  
Both  these  arguments,  however,  are  not  conclusive.  Monitoring  does  not  coincide  with 
oversight. Incentives to monitor existing private schemes may serve the purpose of deciding 
if and what kind of public intervention is needed. More in detail, the evolution of the smart 
regulation agenda, especially in the EU, increasingly points at ‘closing the policy cycle’, and 
thus  at  engaging  in  constant  monitoring  of  the  effects  of  existing  regulatory  schemes  – 
whether  public  or  private  –  through  the  use  of  indicators  and  a  sequential,  logically 
consistent  use  of  ex ante,  interim  and ex post  evaluation.57 Moreover,  the  fact  that private 
governance arrangements tend to be global certainly implies that the best possible response 
would in many cases be an appraisal by international bodies or through public regulatory 
cooperation; however, nothing prevents a national or regional policymaker from assessing 
whether certain international rules are sufficient or desirable with respect to its own public 
policy goals.  
That said,  we  conceived  our  overall  evaluation framework  along  a  number  of sequential 
steps.  
Step 1  Origin and type of private governance. As  explained  in  the  previous  sections,  most 
private schemes are not generated by policy decisions; at the same time, there is a 
variety  of  schemes  dealing  with  one,  a sub-set,  or  all  phases  of  the policy  cycle 
(described using the ANIME framework as in Figure 2 above). This determines the 
depth  and  scope  of  the  evaluation  to  be  performed.  At  the  same  time,  the 
description  of  the  type  of  initiative  could  take  into  account  the  reasons  for  the 
                                                   
57 See the European Commission Communication on Smart Regulation in the EU, COM(2010)543, 8 
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creation of the private governance scheme (signalling, controlling the value chain, 
complementing public regulation, replacing/pre-empting public regulation, inter-
firm coordination and co-opetition, collusion/mutual benefit, etc.), which in turn 
orients the direction of the assessment.  
Step 2  Governance  preconditions.  The  analysis  of  existing  experiences  in  the  literature 
suggests that a number of governance features can positively affect the performance 
of  private  governance  schemes.  This  phase  implies  the  assessment  of  the 
preconditions for the effectiveness of a private governance scheme from a public 
policy standpoint. As such, it includes the use of indicators such as participation, 
materiality, completeness, diversity of funding, specific governance arrangements, 
internal  use  of  indicators  and  existence  of  self-evaluation  or  external  evaluation 
arrangements.58  
Step 3  Quality, legitimacy, enforcement. This step of the framework entails the analysis of 
how the arrangements identified in step 2 possibly affect these three key dimensions 
of private governance.59  
Step 4  Effectiveness. Three different types of indicators seem relevant for an evaluation of 
the  effectiveness  of  private  governance:  i)  activity  and  governance  indicators. 
Indicators that correlate governance features and regulatory activities of the private 
governance  scheme;  ii)  compliance  indicators,  i.e.  indicators  used  as  means  of 
reporting  and  signalling  compliance  with  statutory  goals  helping  verifying 
consistency  between  means  and  goals;  and  iii)  Impact  indicators, which  include 
criteria  and  indicators  used  to  evaluate  the  performance  of  private  regulatory 
schemes and their impact on different constituencies – e.g. whether the expected 
distributional consequences have occurred or wealth transfers are needed to correct 
unexpected effects. These latter ‘meta-indicators’, in particular, are useful for public 
policymakers to understand whether private regulators evaluate themselves on the 
basis of ‘private’ effectiveness.  
Step 5  Incorporation in public policy appraisal. The evaluation of the effectiveness of private 
governance  arrangements  becomes  an  important  input  to  the  forms  of  public 
evaluation  of  policy  options  that  are  available,  for  example  at  the  EU  level. 
Depending on the results of previous steps, the most appropriate tools that will host 
the  evaluation  will  be  an  ex-ante  analysis,  an  interim  or  ex  post  evaluation.  In 
addition, it is important that a number of additional filters are applied to private 
governance. These include a number of screens, normally available (although not 
yet fully developed) in the European Commission’s impact assessment practice: 
o  Competition assessment: the interaction of competitors within private governance 
schemes  can  lead  to  forms  of  collusion  and  anticompetitive  outcomes;  at  the 
same time, vertical agreements that are aimed at securing private benefit might 
not  always  converge  towards  a  virtuous  outcome  –  take  the  example  of 
GlobalGAP,  or  private  agreements  between  ISPs  and  content  providers  for 
copyright enforcement in cyberspace. Competition assessment tools have been 
developed by the OECD over the past few years, and are still insufficiently used 
in ex ante policy appraisal60. They could be put to use with the aim to assess 
whether  the  private  governance  scheme  at  hand  are  likely  to  hamper  the 
                                                   
58 An example of a paper that uses indicators to assess the existence of such preconditions is Fuchs & 
Kalfagianni (2010). 
59 See above, beginning of section 2 for a definition of these three dimensions. 
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competitive process by raising non-participants’ costs, worsen barriers to entry 
of  expansion,  raise  prices  above  competitive  levels,  etc.  These  tools  can  be 
designed  in  a  way  that  mirrors  current  knowledge  in  competition  law 
enforcement,  such  as  for  example  the  assessment  of  the  existence  of  basic 
preconditions  for  stable  collusion  (transparency,  symmetry, 
enforcement/retaliation, homogeneity of products, etc.).  
o  SIA. The sustainability impact assessment methodology has been developed and 
applied  at  the  EU  level  mostly  along  with  the  negotiation  of  free  trade 
agreements  (see  i.a.  George &  Kirkpatrick,  2007).  This  toolkit  is  conceived  to 
assess a variety of sustainability-related consequences starting from negotiations 
pure  related  to  trade.  As  such,  it  has  developed  in  a  way  that  accounts  for 
private governance schemes, as well as constant consultation and involvement 
of public and private partners. The European Commission has used the tools in 
a  number  of  occasions,  including  in  the  development  of  its  new  strategy  on 
tourism  and  horticulture,  as  well  as  in  international  trade  negotiations  with 
several partners.61 
o  Crime-proofing.  A  methodology  for  testing  proposed  legislation  against  the 
likelihood  of  criminal  behaviour  has  been  developed  by  the  TRANSCRIME 
project.62 For example, one of the applications led the authors to find that the 
eAccessibility communication of the European Commission left the regulation of 
online payment systems to self-regulation, without fully assessing the impact 
that this policy option would exert on security and crime.  
o  Fundamental rights test. A specific methodology to assess impacts of proposed 
policy  options  on  fundamental  rights  is  available  since  May  2011  on  the 
Commission’s website. This methodology includes a fundamental rights check-
list, which – although not very detailed – could guide the assessment of various 
policy options with respect to certain, ‘non-negotiable’ issues.63  
o  Specific risk assessment. This test could be designed as focusing on ‘what can go 
wrong’ with private governance. As we described in section 2 above, depending 
on  the  circumstances  lock-in  effects  and  collective  action  problems,  path 
dependency,  status  quo  bias,  anchoring  and  framing  effects,  hard-to-detect 
changes,  divergence  of  interests  and  self-indulgence  in  the  evaluation  can 
emerge, thus undermining the effectiveness of a private governance scheme. 
o  Sectoral competitiveness proofing. This test was recently added by the European 
Commission to the toolkit to be used within an ex ante impact assessment of a 
new  policy  initiative.64 However,  the  European  Commission  clarified  in  its 
recent working paper: “In the case of policy interventions of a self-regulatory 
nature (such as codes of conduct, or voluntary standards), the case for an in-
depth analysis of impacts on sectoral competitiveness is likely to be limited since 
                                                   
61  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/march/tradoc_127974.pdf.  See  PWC  study  on 
horticulture. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_130129.pdf  
62 See http://transcrime.cs.unitn.it/tc/fso/pubblicazioni/AP/Final_Report-
A_study_on_Crime_Proofing.pdf  
63 http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/key_docs/docs/sec_2011_0567_en.pdf  
64 See European Commission Staff Working Document, Operational Guidance For Assessing Impacts 
On  Sectoral  Competitiveness  Within  The  Commission  Impact  Assessment  System,  A 
“Competitiveness  Proofing”  Toolkit  for  use  in  Impact  Assessments,  SEC(2012)91  final,  27  January 
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the  sector  itself  plays  a key  role  in  determining  the  content  of  the  initiative. 
However, more detailed scrutiny may be required with regard to impacts on 
competition  within  the  sector  and  on  the  competitiveness  of  upstream  or 
downstream  sectors.”  Given  our  approach  to  private  regulation,  this  ‘non-
interference’ approach appears unfortunate: to the contrary, the competitiveness 
impact of a given private regulation scheme must be carefully appraised.  
o  Overall policy coherence test. Most important of all, from the standpoint of public 
policy  it  is  essential  to  assess  whether  private  governance  schemes  have  set 
operational and specific objectives, which are consistent with the long-term goal 
set by public policymakers. For example, the EU has set important long-term 
goals related to competitiveness, innovation, poverty and sustainability within 
its Europe2020 strategy and the seven flagship initiatives that compose it. Even 
if fully effective, private governance schemes might not be fully aligned with the 
public goals set within given jurisdictions, which set targets that might require 
additional policy intervention. The use of policy appraisal tools, be they ex ante 
or ex post, is essential to test this form of alignment between private gain, social 
benefits and policy targets.  
This theoretical framework can easily accommodate the use of at least three different types of 
indicators, which have been advocated in the literature. First, governance indicators can be 
used at step 3 of our proposed analytical framework to enable an analysis of whether the 
basic preconditions for effective private regulation exist. Performance indicators can be used 
at  step  4  of  the  analysis  to  assess  effectiveness  directly.  Finally,  distributional  impact 
indicators  are  essential  in  step  5  of  the  analysis,  when  the  overall  impact  of  the  private 
governance scheme is assessed (Cafaggi & Pistor, 2012). 
4.  Conclusion 
Private  regulation  is  emerging  as  a  viable  solution  for  a  number  of  problems  faced  by 
contemporary societies, and can be superior to traditional command and control regulation 
due  to  informational  asymmetries,  superior  coordination,  the  need  for  trans-national 
cooperation  and  standardization,  and  also  the superior  flexibility  and  adaptability  of  de-
ossified, privately implemented, designed and enforced rules. This development is, however, 
still  largely  ignored  by  guidance  documents  on  ex  ante  policy  appraisal  for  public 
policymakers; meanwhile, private regulators themselves are developing their own guidance 
documents, even in the form of meta-private regulation offered by emerging conglomerates 
such as the ISEAL Alliance. In this paper, we try to propose a theoretical framework that 
could guide public policymakers in assessing whether, and in what form, private regulation 
can prove the most appropriate form of policy intervention. A key role in this respect is to be 
attributed to the assessment of the effectiveness of private regulation as an alternative or 
more  likely  as  a  complement  to  public  regulation.  We  propose  a  six-step  theoretical 
framework and argue that IA techniques should:  
a)  Define an integrated framework including both the possibility that private regulation can be used 
as an alternative or as a complement to public legislation. This, in turn, calls for a taxonomy of 
the many ways in which public and private regulation can coexist along a continuum, 
from extreme cases in which private regulators take care of most of the policy process 
(from  agenda-setting  to  the  setting  of  basic  principles,  implementation  criteria, 
enforcement  practices  and  compliance  monitoring);  to  more  hybrid  (and  also  more 
recurrent) cases in which public policymakers set the ultimate objectives and principles, 
and  private  governance  complements  them  by  setting  modes  of  implementation  and 
compliance (as in the case of standardization policy at the EU level). PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REGULATION: MAPPING THE LABYRINTH | 29 
 
b)  Involve private parties in public IAs. When the use of private regulation is contemplated by 
public policymakers, private regulators should be asked to contribute to the IA exercise 
in order to define the best strategy or strategies that would ensure achievement of the 
regulatory  objectives.  This  of  course  can  happen  only  when  public  regulators 
intentionally leave at least part of the policy space to action by private regulators, and not 
in all those cases in which private governance emerges in the absence of the law.  
c)  Contemplate the deployment of indicators related to governance and activities of the regulators 
and their ability to coordinate and solve disputes with other regulators. Although indicators are 
widespread in private governance, we contend that there might be significant differences 
between  the  effectiveness  perceived  by  a  private  governance  scheme  (in  the  form  of 
‘private payoff’ of the members) and the ability of the same scheme to achieve publicly 
set  regulatory  objectives  (the  ‘social  benefits’  of  private  regulation).  Using  indicators 
oriented towards the private benefit to measure progress towards the achievement of 
public goals would inevitably prove misleading: Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ does not 
always  work  that  smoothly.  Accordingly,  various  types  of  indicators  (governance, 
impacts, distributional effects) must be used to assess compliance with overall regulatory 
objectives. 
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